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 152) will connect
a person’s current feelings to the past, especially to thinking or being reminded about a prior experience. Study
1 presented stories featuring a target character who felt sad, mad, or happy after an event in the past and who
many days later felt that same negative or positive emotion upon seeing a cue related to the prior incident. For
some story endings, the character’s emotion upon seeing the cue matched, or was congruent, with the current
situation, whereas for others, the emotion mismatched the present circumstances. Participants were asked to
explain the cause of each character’s current feelings. As a further comparison, children and adults listened to
behavior cuing stories and provided explanations for characters’ present actions. Study 2 presented emotional
scenarios that varied by emotion-situation fit (whether the character’s emotion matched the current situation),
person-person fit (whether the character’s emotion matched another person’s), and past history information
(whether information about the character’s past was known). Results showed that although there were several
significant developments with increasing age, even most 3-year-olds demonstrated some knowledge about
connections between past events and present emotions and between thinking and feeling. Indeed, children
5 years and younger revealed strikingly cogent understanding about historical-mental influences in certain sit-
uations, especially where they had to explain why a person, who had experienced a negative event in the past,
was currently feeling sad or mad in a positive situation. These findings help underwrite a more general ac-




Humans are social creatures, spending the majority of
our lives talking with, interacting with, and thinking
about other people. Emotions are powerful regulators
and organizers of this social enterprise. How we in-
terpret social experiences and express and act upon
our own feelings and the feelings of people around us
can encourage, maintain, or disrupt social bonds. At
the same time, social interactions are critically guided
by our knowledge of people’s inner mental lives,
their minds. We understand people as intentional
and goal-directed, and thus, we interpret actions and
emotions with respect to what a person (or what we
think a person) wants, believes, thinks, or intends.
Underpinning this mental-psychological stance to-
ward persons is a key appreciation of people as his-
torical individuals, as beings living lives extended
through time. That is, we understand that people’s
current actions, emotions, and thoughts are not only
shaped by the here and now but are also intimately
connected to their experiences from the past.
Although these are often studied as three separate
foundations of social knowledge, the current research
examines children’s development of a coherent under-





 between life history, mind, and emotion. Indeed,
achieving a naïve psychological understanding of
people requires more than just an awareness of a va-
riety of states and occurrences (e.g., emotions, thoughts,
actions)—children must learn to assemble these
notions together to provide coherent, holistic expla-
nations of their own and others’ lives.
How might past events, thoughts, and emotions be
connected? From an everyday commonsense view,
we often find ourselves experiencing emotions that
are not caused by present situations per se but rather
by the thoughts these events trigger in our minds, in-
cluding thoughts about past experiences. Thinking
about positive experiences can energize or comfort,
whereas ruminating on negative images can depress
or enrage. This interconnection between thoughts
and feelings is stressed in scientific as well as every-
day theories. Cognitive theories of depression, for ex-
ample, emphasize the causative role of thinking, with
therapy aimed at changing thought processes to im-
prove emotional well-being (e.g., Abramson, Selig-
man, & Teasdale, 1978; Beck, 1976; Nolen-Hoeksema,
1991; Sacco & Beck, 1985). Importantly, in our every-
day social cognition we construe the link between sit-
uations, thoughts, and emotions as distinctively indi-
vidual. That is, because the biographical landscapes
of our lives are different, we understand that the same
situation can elicit different thoughts and therefore
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different emotions in different people. For example,
we know that a child whose kitten was lost forever
may feel sad upon seeing a cat’s collar, whereas for
another child the collar may elicit no emotions or
even positive ones. We realize that the collar may
cause the first but not the second child to remember
and dwell upon the tragedy of her lost pet.
The current research investigates the degree to
which 3- to 7-year-olds share these same insights
about interconnections between past events, thoughts,
and emotions. The focus was particularly on develop-
mental changes in two features of children’s explana-
tions for people’s emotions in different kinds of situ-
ations: (1) When do children explain people’s feelings




 experiences rather than by





stances? And, (2) in what kinds of situations do they




about a significant event from the past? As we will
show, children’s explanations reveal developing in-
sight into two key understandings: that people’s
emotional reactions to current situations can be
shaped by their distinctive experiences from the past,
and that thinking can influence a person’s emotional
well-being.
Recent research by Lagattuta, Wellman, and Fla-
vell (1997) showed that children start to link past ex-
perience, current emotion, and thinking during the
preschool years. For example, imagine that Anne’s fa-
vorite doll was stepped on by a circus clown. Many
days later she goes to a birthday party, sees the clown
perform, and starts to feel sad. Lagattuta et al. (1997)
presented preschoolers with stories featuring such
cue-to-past-event scenarios and asked them to ex-
plain the cause of the current emotions. Many 3-year-
olds, the majority of 4-year-olds, and nearly all 5- and
6-year-olds could sometimes explain that a person’s
emotions were caused by being reminded about





“Anne’s sad because the clown makes her remember
about her broken doll”). By age 5, children used cog-
nitive cuing to explain characters’ emotions across the
majority of the six story trials. Moreover, preschoolers
demonstrated awareness that this link between situa-
tions, thoughts, and emotions is individualized. That
is, even 3-year-olds consistently predicted that the
cue would elicit different emotions in someone who
did not share in the past event.
The knowledge preschoolers revealed in this re-
search about connections between thinking, past
events, and emotion is at odds with many earlier find-
ings. For example, although several studies have





 mediate between situations and
emotions—people’s desires for, beliefs about, or ap-
praisals of an event can influence their emotions
(Banerjee, 1993; Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews, &
Cooke, 1989; Wellman & Banerjee, 1991)—preschoolers’




 of active, mental ide-
ation, or thinking, has been shown to be limited.
Here, it is important to distinguish between two
senses of “thinking.” In a very broad sense, “think-
ing” is used to encompass most mental states (e.g.,
desiring, remembering, perceiving). In a strict sense,
however, “thinking” refers only to active, conscious,
ongoing mental activity. Thus, despite young chil-
dren’s knowledge about some connections between
emotion and thinking construed broadly (e.g., be-
tween goals and emotions; see Stein & Levine, 1987,
1989; Stein & Trabasso, 1989), they demonstrate only
minimal understanding of the presence and influence
of thinking in the strict sense (see Flavell, Green, &
Flavell, 1995). For example, unlike older children and
adults, preschoolers rarely suggest changing one’s
appraisal or thoughts about a situation as a means for
alleviating negative emotion (Altshuler & Ruble,
1989; Band & Weisz, 1988; Harris, 1989; Harris, Guz,
Lipian, & Man-Shu, 1985; Harris & Lipian, 1989).
Moreover, children younger than 8 are not consis-
tently aware of when and what people are thinking
about, even persons engaged in mental tasks such
as reading, attending effortfully, or problem solving
(Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1993; Flavell et al., 1995;
Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1998; but see Estes, 1998).
In contrast, Lagattuta et al.’s (1997) findings dem-
onstrate an early appreciation of the influence of ac-
tive thinking on emotions (thinking in the narrow
sense) combined with an awareness of important con-
nections between emotions, thinking, and prior expe-
rience. These data cannot be easily discounted. The
results were replicated across three different studies
using a variety of cue types and formats. More impor-
tantly, children’s knowledge about thinking, cogni-
tive cuing, and emotions was not simply inferred
from yes/no responses or forced choice answers.
Rather, children’s explanations confirmed their co-
herent understandings.
The possibility explored in this study is that young
children are indeed knowledgeable about the pres-
ence and influence of thinking, even in the narrow
sense, and important connections between past
events, thoughts, and emotions, but, at first, only in
certain limited contexts. Although varied in several
fashions, the stories used by Lagattuta et al. (1997) all
shared three features: (1) they focused on sadness; (2)
they required children to explain emotional reactions
that were unusual given the present circumstances




vided information about characters’ relevant past ex-
periences (e.g., the clown broke the character’s doll in
the past). Any or all of these features may encourage
children to link current emotions to thinking about
the past. If influential, these features would provide
important insights into the developmental course of a
coherent understanding of past history, mind, and
emotion.
Consider emotion valence. Natural language re-
search has shown that preschoolers spontaneously
talk with their parents more often about the causes of
unpleasant emotions than the sources of positive feel-
ings (Dunn, Bretherton, & Munn, 1987; Dunn &
Brown, 1993; Lagattuta, 1999), and reminisce more
frequently about past negative versus past positive
experiences (Dunn & Brown, 1991; Fivush, 1991; Kue-
bli & Fivush, 1992; Lagattuta, 1999; Miller & Sperry,
1988). This focus may encourage children to develop
earlier, more sophisticated knowledge about the
causes of negative emotions before positive emotions,
particularly in relation to a person’s prior history.
Consistent with this, exploratory data from Gnepp
and Gould (1985) revealed that 5- and 8-year-olds
could more accurately predict how a past negative
versus a past positive experience would change a per-
son’s emotional reaction to a current situation. Yet,
structured interview studies have found that when
young children are asked to describe an emotional
event from the past, they provide more lengthy (but
not necessarily more causal or evaluative) narratives
about “happy” events in comparison with “mad,”
“sad,” or “afraid” episodes (Liwag & Stein, 1995).
Aside from emotion valence, the degree to which a
person’s emotion is congruent, or matches the objec-
tive situation, may well be influential; this congru-





young preschoolers can pair conventional emotional
reactions to common situations, such as, gifts make a
person happy (Borke, 1971; Russell, 1990). When
faced with characters displaying atypical emotions
(e.g., feeling mad upon receiving a present), young
children often reconcile this conflicting information
by referring to people’s unique attitudes or appraisals
(Gnepp, 1983; Gove & Keating, 1979). In contrast,
when a person’s feelings are conventional for a situa-
tion, such person-specific information is often ig-
nored (Gnepp, 1989; Gnepp, Klayman, & Trabasso,
1982). Even adults more frequently attribute people’s
atypical reactions to psychological causes rather than
to external events (Jones, 1990; Jones & Nisbett, 1971;
Kelley, 1967, 1971). Reasonably, then, because the sce-
narios used by Lagattuta et al. (1997) asked children
to explain people’s sadness that “mismatched” cur-
rent situations (e.g., Anne feels sad when a clown
gives her a balloon), they may have encouraged chil-
dren to look beyond the “here and now” and con-
sider their past experiences and their thoughts. In-
deed, Gnepp (1989a) proposes that young children’s
search for personal information is often motivated
by incongruence between a person’s emotion and
the situation.
Finally, emotional situations themselves may facil-
itate children’s early knowledge about thinking. For
example, in one of their 14 studies, Flavell et al. (1995)
found that young children more consistently attrib-
uted thoughts to people during emotionally arousing
events (e.g., waiting to get a shot) than during physi-
cal or cognitive activities (e.g., reading a book). In-
deed, 5- and 7-year-olds asserted that people sitting
quietly before or after a negative event were thinking
nearly 100% of the time. This differential knowledge
about thinking for emotions versus actions suggests
that young children’s first insights about thinking as
conscious, active, mental ideation may be intimately
tied to their understanding of emotion, not people’s
minds in general.
In sum, young children’s early knowledge about
connections between past events, thinking, and cur-
rent experience may be especially revealed in emo-
tional versus behavioral contexts, and especially in
situations where (1) people are experiencing negative
versus positive feelings; (2) people’s feelings are un-
usual in that they cannot easily be explained by cur-
rent events; and (3) they are provided with informa-
tion about people’s prior related experiences. The





The primary focus of Study 1 concerned preschoolers’
understanding about connections between past events,





 (i.e., positive or negative





 (i.e., the degree to which the person’s
emotion is conventional or unusual for the situation).
To investigate whether emotional situations in
general promote children’s early understanding of
thinking, Study 1 further examined whether children




 as caused by





 This emotion versus behavior con-
trast was chosen to provide a direct test of Flavell et
al.’s (1995) suggestive evidence that young chil-
dren may develop earlier competence in linking
thinking and emotions in comparison to thinking
and actions.
 









































































 18,2–27,10), with 9 males
and 9 females in each age group. All participants were
residents of a midwestern university community.
Children were recruited from multiple preschool and
kindergarten classrooms in the local area, and adults
were undergraduate or graduate students at the uni-
versity. In total, the participants were 77% European
American, 17% Asian American, and 6% other ethnic-
ities. To aid in developing appropriate story scenar-
ios, an additional 15 preschoolers participated in
pilot testing.
Materials and Procedure





 stories (two focusing on positive emotions and





 stories. Each story presentation consisted of




 6 inch laminated
cards. Figure 1 shows a pictorial example of a nega-
tive emotion-cuing story and Figure 2 illustrates an
example of a behavior-cuing story.
As shown in Figure 1, emotion-cuing stories fea-
tured a target character who experiences an affective
event (happy, sad, mad—in this case sad) paired with
a particular visual cue. Many days later, the character
sees an identical object from his or her past experience
(i.e., the cue) and reexperiences the same emotion.
Each emotion-cuing story had two types of endings.
In emotion-match endings, the character’s emotion





, whereas in emotion-mismatch endings
the character’s emotion after seeing the cue is atypical
for, or discordant with, the current situation.
For example, Figure 1 shows a story about a girl
who feels sad when her rabbit is scared away by the




version, she feels sad many days later when the same
spotted dog tramples some flowers she had just
picked. Thus her emotion (sad) matches, or is congru-
ent with, the event in the current situation (dog tram-




version of the same story, the girl feels sad again
when the same spotted dog slowly walks over, sits
down, and wags his tail “real friendly.” Here, her sad-
ness mismatches, or is unusual for, the pleasant cur-
rent situation (dog wagging tail). The other negative
story featured a girl who feels mad when a clown
breaks her favorite doll and who later feels mad again
at a party when that same clown either (1) gives her a
red balloon, or (2) soaks her with a water balloon. One
positive story featured a boy who feels happy when
his dog performs an “amazing new trick” with a star
beanbag. Many days later the boy feels happy again
when (1) he reaches to pick up the star beanbag and
finds a shiny quarter or (2) he reaches to pick up the
star beanbag and a bee lands on him. The other posi-
tive story was about a boy who feels happy when he
and his sister have a silly time chasing fireflies with a
purple net and who later feels happy again when he is
getting ready for a picnic and (1) he finds his needed
shoes next to the purple net, or (2) he spills his milk-
shake next to the purple net.
The format of behavior-cuing stories closely re-
sembled emotion-cuing stories with only three differ-
ences: (1) during the past event the target character
engaged in a particular action rather than expressed
Figure 1 Illustrations for a negative emotion-cuing story




an emotion; (2) during the current situation the cue
elicited changes in the character’s behavior; and (3)
there was no match–mismatch distinction. Figure 2
shows the illustrations for a behavior-cuing story about
a boy who searches for his t-rex dinosaur after he and
his friend decide to pretend play “dinosaur moun-
tain” with an orange bucket. Many days later the boy
looks for his t-rex dinosaur again when he sees his fa-
ther take the orange bucket and mop out of the closet
to clean. The other behavior-cuing story featured a
girl who wears her grandfather’s green-striped scarf
while raking leaves with him and who many days
later runs to look at the leaves again when she sees the
green-striped scarf drop onto the closet floor.
During the testing procedure, 4-year-olds, 5-year-




 stories as the experi-
menter attached the picture cards on an upright board.
For these age groups, each participant received two
emotion-match stories (one positive emotion-match
and one negative emotion-match), two emotion-
mismatch stories (one positive emotion-mismatch and
one negative emotion-mismatch), and two behavior-
cuing stories. The number of scenarios for 3-year-olds
was reduced, as in Lagattuta et al. (1997), because of
the increased time required to narrate the stories and
elicit coherent explanations in such young children.





one trial of each core story type (i.e., emotion-match,
emotion-mismatch, behavior). The presentation of
different story types was randomized and counter-
balanced across participants.
We followed the same questioning format as that
used in Studies 2 and 3 of Lagattuta et al. (1997). To
ensure that the initial event of each story was under-
stood, the experimenter asked participants to explain
the cause of the character’s original emotion or be-
havior: “Why is [character] [sad, mad, happy]/[doing




). At the conclusion
of the final scenario where the cue appears, the exper-
imenter asked participants to explain the character’s





 for emotion-cuing stories was “Why
does [character] start to feel [sad, mad, happy] right
now?” The parallel test question for behavior-cuing
stories was “Why is [character] [doing that action]
right now?” A supplementary test question was
asked if the participant explained that a character
was remembering the past event but he or she did not
mention the cue: “What made [character] think about
the [past event] right now?” If participants explained
a character’s emotion or behavior by referring to the
past event but they did not use mental language (e.g.,
“Mary’s sad because her rabbit ran away”) the exper-





thinking about [the past event] right now?” To help
participants clarify and extend their explanations the
experimenter paraphrased responses and encouraged
additional explanations. For example, if a child re-
sponded, “Mary’s sad because she doesn’t like that
dog anymore,” the experimenter would ask, “Why
doesn’t Mary like that dog anymore?” Only after the
child continued to provide no response or repeatedly
answered “I don’t know” did the experimenter con-
tinue with the next story. Stein and her colleagues
(e.g., Liwag & Stein, 1995; Stein & Levine, 1989) have
argued that more extensive clarification and question-
ing of children’s responses of the sort used here helps
young children more clearly reveal their reasoning.
After explaining the target character’s emotion or





 on three story trials (an emotion-
match, an emotion-mismatch, and a behavior-cuing
story). This forced-choice question required partici-
pants to predict the emotional or behavioral reaction
of a second person in the current situation; for exam-
ple, “What about Amy? Amy also sees the spotted
dog. How does Amy feel right now, sad or OK?” For
behavior-cuing stories this was modified; for exam-
ple: “What about Matthew’s dad? Matthew’s dad
also sees the orange bucket. Will he just keep cleaning
the kitchen, or run to find the t-rex dinosaur too?” The
order of the forced-choice alternative was counterbal-
Figure 2 Illustrations for a behavior-cuing story used in
Study 1 shown in reduced form.
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anced so that participants biased to choose always the
first or second alternative would perform at chance.
All participants were interviewed individually by
a white female experimenter in a private room. Their
responses were tape-recorded and transcribed verba-




Explanations were rich and varied. Our content
analyses focused specifically on whether participants
explained current emotions in terms of the character’s
past experience, the character’s thinking, or by con-
necting the character’s thinking about the past to a cur-





First, we examined whether children and
adults explained a character’s current emotion or be-





 explanations included mention of any of the
following as the reason for the character’s current re-
action: (1) the past event itself (e.g., “Mary’s sad be-
cause her rabbit is gone”); (2) a current attitude, emo-
tion, belief, or thought related to the prior experience





”); or (3) seeing the cue from the past










 explanations that focused exclusively
on the present situation, as in: “He’s happy because
he thinks the bee has pretty colors,” and “She’s look-
ing out the window because it’s sunny.”









 explanations by a primary
coder. Independent coding of 50% of the transcripts
for each age group by a second person yielded 98%





Although current experience explana-
tions were offered by nearly all children and adults





 that a character’s present
feelings or actions had been caused by a distal past
experience. Initial analyses focused on the frequency
of these past-oriented causes by assigning a score
from 0 to 6 for the 
 
number of story trials
 
 for which chil-





tions. For these and all other analyses, the scores of
3-year-olds (who received only three story trials)
were doubled so that analyses could be conducted on
an equivalent scale.
Table 1 presents the primary results. As shown in
the top row of the table, the frequency of prior expe-
rience explanations increased during the preschool






















 .001. Tukey’s Honestly Sig-
nificant Difference (HSD) comparisons showed that
adults more often connected characters’ current emo-
tions or behaviors to past experience than 3-, 4-, or
5-year-olds and that 5-year-olds mentioned a charac-

























tions) and will not be considered further.
Next, we examined whether prior experience expla-
nations varied by story type. Recall that scenarios var-
ied along three dimensions: (1) whether the emotion





); (2) whether the emotion was









 to be explained was emotional or
behavioral. Because 3-year-olds did not receive one





1 Note that counterbalancing the three core story types (emo-
tion-match, emotion-mismatch, and behavior) across three story
trials for eighteen 3-year-olds (with the constraint that each child
heard one positive emotion, one negative emotion, and one
behavior story) resulted in 18 behavior cuing trials, 10 negative
emotion-mismatch trials, 8 negative emotion-match trials, 8 pos-
itive emotion-mismatch trials, and 10 positive emotion-match
trials for the 3-year-olds as a group.
 
Table 1 Study 1: Percentage of Prior Experience Explanations
by Age and Story Type
 
Age











Positive emotion 30 22 50 94
Negative emotion 13 33 50 94
Emotion-mismatch
Positive emotion 38 39 56 94














Percentage of prior experience explanations out of six trials per




Percentage of prior experience explanations out of one trial per
participant for each emotion cuing story combination, out of two
trials for behavior cuing stories; out of a reduced set for 3-year-




adults provided prior experience explanations for
nearly all story trials (96% explanations), the fol-
lowing analyses focus on 4- and 5-year-olds. Expla-
nations for emotion-cuing stories are analyzed first
and then compared with explanations for behavior-
cuing stories. 
The main body of Table 1 shows the primary re-










tion Valence (2: positive or negative) repeated measures






















































 .01. As evident in
Table 1, the effects for valence and emotion–situation
fit were driven by 4- (83% explanations) and 5-year-
olds’ (89% explanations) high performance on nega-





 negative emotions with mismatched conditions
(e.g., feeling mad upon receiving a balloon from a
clown) were particularly compelling to 4- and 5-year-
olds. They elicited more frequent references to prior













though not included in formal analyses, the data from
3-year-olds and adults also clearly manifest this pat-
tern, with the highest frequency of prior experience
explanations being for negative emotion-mismatch
stories.
Prior experience explanations for behavior-cuing
stories were then compared with their responses for




 Story Type (3: be-
havior, emotion-match, emotion-mismatch) repeated

















 .001. Tukey’s HSD compari-
sons revealed that prior experience responses were



































 .05. An additional
Age (2) 
 
 Story Type (2) ANOVA compared perfor-
mance on behavior cuing stories with just negative
emotion-mismatch stories. Here, a main effect for type,
F(1, 34)  9.65, p  .01, revealed that 4- and 5-year-
olds used prior experience more often to explain un-
usual negative emotions (M  86% explanations)
than to explain behaviors (M  63% explanations).
Therefore, whereas preschoolers equally attributed
the cause of both actions and emotions to a person’s
past history, they revealed most cogent knowledge
about the influence of prior experience when a person
was feeling sad or mad in a typically positive situa-
tion. Again, note that this same pattern holds for
3-year-olds as well.
Thinking Explanations
Coding. Further analyses examined how children
and adults bridged together a character’s current
and prior circumstances in their explanations for
emotions and behaviors. In particular, we focused on
the frequency with which participants explained that
a person’s current reaction was caused by remember-
ing, thinking, or being reminded about the prior
event, such as, “She’s mad because she’s remember-
ing her lost rabbit,” or “He’s happy because he’s
thinking about that trick.” Such thinking explanations
are important for two reasons. They not only mea-
sure young children’s knowledge about the presence
and influence of active mental ideation, or thinking, a
topic of recent theoretical debate (see Estes, 1998;
Flavell et al., 1995; Lagattuta et al., 1997); but they
also provide a further test of the significance of story
type on explanations for actions or feelings, par-
ticularly, the salience of the mismatched negative
emotions.
Recall that a thinking prompt was included during
questioning if a child or adult referred to the past
event but did not explicitly refer to thinking, remem-
bering, etc.: “Is [character] thinking about [past event]
right now?” Thus, thinking explanations were coded
as either prompted or unprompted following the
criteria established by Lagattuta et al. (1997). Un-
prompted explanations were those in which the partic-
ipant spontaneously referred to thinking in reference
to the past event (e.g., “She’s sad because she’s re-
membering her rabbit being gone”), whereas prompted
explanations were those in which the participant
directly referred to the past event (e.g., “She’s sad be-
cause her bunny is still gone”) and then asserted in
response to the thinking prompt that the character
was remembering that prior experience.
Note that the mere inclusion or omission of a men-
tal term did not determine whether an explanation
was coded as a thinking explanation. For example,
children and adults could not simply use the word
“think” in their explanation (e.g., “I think he’s happy
because he found that quarter”). Instead, the word
had to be used causally and in reference to the story
character (e.g., “He’s happy because he’s thinking
about his sister”). Moreover, when participants did
not use mental terms spontaneously in their re-
sponses, they could still provide a thinking explana-
tion with the aid of the prompt.
Reliability based on 50% of the transcripts for each
age group resulted in 98% interrater agreement for
thinking explanations, including whether the response
was prompted or unprompted. All discrepancies
were resolved by discussion.
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Analyses. Participants received a score from 0 to 6
for the number of story trials for which they offered
thinking explanations (either prompted or unprompted),
known as their total thinking score. In Table 2 data are
presented for both total thinking and unprompted
thinking responses (unprompted responses appear in
parentheses), but statistical analyses are reported on
only the total score data. Identical ANOVAs on just
the unprompted scores yielded the same trends and
differences as those reported for total scores.
As shown in the top row of Table 2, an Age (4) 
Gender ANOVA for total thinking explanations re-
sulted in a main effect for age, F(3, 64 )  28.09, p 
.001. Whereas only a minority of the explanations
provided by 3- and 4-year-olds claimed that charac-
ters were currently thinking about a prior incident,
the majority of 5-year-olds’ and adults’ did so. All
between-age comparisons were significant, except for
the difference between 3- and 4-year-olds (Tukey’s
HSD), ps  .05. Again, gender was not significant (for
males, M  54% explanations; for females, M  55%
explanations) and will not be considered further.
The main body of Table 2 shows the influence of
story type on total thinking explanations. Again, data
are presented for 3-year-olds and adults but the anal-
yses are focused on 4- and 5-year-olds. An Age (2) 
Emotion–Situation Fit (2)  Emotion Valence (2) re-
peated measures ANOVA resulted in a main effect for
age, F(1, 34)  4.92, p  .03, for fit, F(1, 34)  25.37, p 
.001, and for valence, F(1, 34)  12.75, p  .001, and a
significant Fit  Valence interaction, F(1, 34)  9.05,
p  .005. Consistent with the prior experience analy-
ses, the effects for emotion–situation fit and emotion
valence resulted from the high frequency of think-
ing explanations that 4- (M  72% explanations) and
5-year-olds (M  89%) gave for negative emotion-
mismatch stories. Tukey’s HSD comparisons con-
firmed that negative emotion-mismatch stories yielded
more frequent references to thinking about the past
than the other three kinds of emotion-cuing stories,
ps  .01 (all other pairwise ns). Moreover, a separate
Age (2)  Story Type (2) ANOVA found that 4- and
5-year-olds demonstrated more sophisticated aware-
ness about when characters were thinking about the
past in their explanations for unusual negative emo-
tions (M  81% explanations) than in their explana-
tions for actions (M  53%), F(1, 34)  10.97, p  .002.
Analyses of thinking explanations thus replicated
the results from prior experience analyses. Four- and
5-year-olds more frequently explained that a person
who felt sad or mad in a currently positive situation
was “thinking about the past” than a person who dis-
played matched negative emotions or matched or
mismatched happiness or who performed some ac-
tion. Importantly, then, unusual negative emotions
not only make past-present linkages more salient
to young children but also encourage preschoolers to
consider that characters might be thinking about some-
thing. Although excluded from the formal analyses, it
is noteworthy that 3-year-olds’ explanations pro-
duced the same pattern of results: The highest fre-
quency of thinking explanations (M  50% explana-
tions) were in the context of explaining why a character
felt negative emotions in a positive situation. More-
over, negative emotion-mismatch stories were the
only story type that elicited a full 100% thinking ex-
planation from adults.
Cognitive Cuing Explanations
Coding. Final analyses focused on a more strin-
gent, yet compelling, measure of children’s knowl-
edge about past events and thinking—their ability to
explain not only that a character is remembering a
past event but also why he or she started to have these
thoughts. Cognitive cuing explanations, such as, “She’s
mad because the clown makes her think about her
doll” are especially revealing because they require co-
herent understanding about three interrelated con-
cepts: the character’s feeling or action was caused by
(1) the cue in the current scene that (2) made the char-
acter think about (3) the past event. Cognitive cuing
explanations are distinct from thinking explanations
in that the participant had to explain that the charac-
Table 2 Study 1: Percentage of Thinking Explanations by Age
and Story Type
Age
Category of Analysis 3 4 5 Adult
Across all storiesa 28 (7) 35 (18) 60 (39) 94 (84)
Emotion-cuing storiesb
Emotion-match
Positive emotion 20 11 44 94
Negative emotion 0 22 50 89
Emotion-mismatch
Positive emotion 38 28 39 94
Negative emotion 50 72 89 100
Behavior-cuing stories 28 39 67 97
a Percentage of total thinking explanations (prompted and un-
prompted combined) out of six trials per participant (out of three
for 3-year-olds), with the percentage of unprompted thinking ex-
planations shown in parentheses.
b Percentage of total thinking explanations out of one trial per par-
ticipant for each emotion-cuing story combination, out of two tri-
als for behavior-cuing stories; out of a reduced set for 3-year-olds
(see footnote 1).
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ter’s action or emotion was caused by thinking about
the past, and further that these thoughts had been
triggered by a particular cue, or reminder, in the cur-
rent situation.
Interrater reliability for cognitive cuing explana-
tions based on 50% of the transcripts at each age pe-
riod, including whether a response was prompted or
unprompted, was 98%. Unprompted cognitive cuing
explanations were those in which the participant
used mental language spontaneously when referring
to the past event. An example of a prompted cognitive
cuing explanation is as follows: Experimenter: Why
did Anne start to feel mad right now? Child: Because
her doll is broken. Experimenter: Is she thinking
about her broken doll right now? Child: Yes. Experi-
menter: What made her start to think about her doll
right now? Child: The clown. All discrepancies were
resolved by discussion.
Analyses. Preschoolers and adults received a score
from 0 to 6 for the number of story trials for which they
offered either a prompted or unprompted cognitive
cuing response, their total cognitive cuing score.
Table 3 presents the primary results of these total
scores (again data for unprompted responses alone
are shown in parentheses). As shown in the top row
of the table, an Age (4)  Gender ANOVA resulted in
a main effect for age, F(3, 64)  39.28, p  .001, and no
effect for gender (for males, M  45%; for females,
M  46% explanations). As with thinking explana-
tions, Tukey’s HSD comparisons revealed that all
pairwise comparisons for age were significant except
for the difference between the 3- and 4-year-olds,
ps  .05.
The main body of Table 3 presents data for story
type. Confirming the pattern found in the two preced-
ing analyses, an Age (2)  Emotion–Situation Fit (2) 
Valence (2) repeated measures ANOVA for total
cognitive cuing responses resulted in a main effect
for age, F(1, 34)  5.68, p  .02, for emotion–situation
fit, F(1, 34)  12.88, p  .001, and for valence, F(1, 34) 
11.18, p  .002, and a Significant Emotion–Situation
Fit  Emotion Valence Interaction, F(1, 34)  5.41, p 
.03. Again, most striking was the greater frequency
with which 4- (M  44% explanations) and 5-year-olds
(M  83%) explained characters’ mismatched nega-
tive emotions in relation to cognitive cuing: perfor-
mance on this story type was significantly higher
than on any other kind of emotion-cuing or behavior-
cuing story, ps  .01. Thus, even under the most strin-
gent criteria, cognitive cuing explanations, preschoolers
demonstrated the greatest knowledge about interre-
lationships between mind, emotion, and the past in
their explanations for why a person was feeling sad
or mad in a conventionally happy situation.
Other Person’s Reaction Question
To examine whether preschoolers and adults
viewed the target character’s feelings or actions in the
final scene as person specific, participants were given
a prediction score from 0 to 3 for the number of trials
for which they predicted a different behavioral or
emotional reaction for the secondary character. An
age (4) ANOVA for prediction scores yielded a main
effect for age, F(3, 68)  3.51, p  .02. Tukey’s HSD
tests revealed that adults (M  96% predictions) more
frequently predicted that the other person would
have a different reaction than 3- (M  74%) or 5-year-
olds (M  74%), ps  .05. Four-year-olds (M  81%
predictions) did not differ from any age group. More
importantly, however, t tests confirmed that all age
groups’ performance was higher than would be ex-
pected by chance, ps  .01. Therefore, both children
and adults demonstrated knowledge that the same
situation can elicit different actions and feelings in
different people.
Discussion
Consistent with Lagattuta et al. (1997), significant
developmental changes were observed from 3 to 5
years of age in children’s understanding about the in-
fluence of past events, thinking, and cognitive cuing
on a person’s current reactions. For example, whereas
only a minority of 3-year-olds’ responses explained a
person’s present action or emotion in terms of think-
Table 3 Study 1: Percentage of Cognitive Cuing Explanations
by Age and Story Type
Age
Category of Analysis 3 4 5 Adult
Across all storiesa 13 (2) 24 (11) 49 (33) 94 (84)
Emotion cuing storiesb
Emotion-match
Positive emotion 10 6 39 94
Negative emotion 0 22 39 89
Emotion-mismatch
Positive emotion 25 22 33 94
Negative emotion 20 44 83 100
Behavior-cuing stories 11 25 53 97
a Percentage of total cognitive cuing explanations (prompted and
unprompted combined) out of six trials per participant (out of
three for 3-year-olds), with the percentage of unprompted cogni-
tive cuing explanations shown in parentheses.
b Percentage of total cognitive cuing explanations out of one trial
per participant for each emotion-cuing story combination, out of
two trials for behavior-cuing stories; out of a reduced set for
3-year-olds (see footnote 1).
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ing or being reminded about the past, the majority
of explanations provided by 5-year-olds and adults
included such historical–mental connections (e.g.,
“Anne’s mad because seeing the clown makes her re-
member her broken doll”).
Confirming the earlier findings by Lagattuta et al.
(1997), even very young children exhibited remark-
able insights about connections between past history,
mind, and current experience in some situations. In-
deed, when asked to explain why a person started to
feel sad or mad in a currently positive situation (neg-
ative emotion-mismatch) 80% of the 3-year-olds, 83% of
the 4-year-olds and 89% of the 5-year-olds attributed
characters’ current emotions to their prior experiences
(e.g., “Mary’s sad because the dog chased the rabbit
away”). Moreover, preschoolers went beyond just
connecting current emotions to past history: They
linked past and present through mental activity. The
majority of 3- to 5-year-olds (50% 3-, 72% 4-, 89% 5-
year-olds) explained that unusual negative emotions
were caused by thinking about the past (e.g., “Mary’s
sad because she’s remembering her rabbit”), with
20% (3-year-olds), 44% (4-year-olds) and 83% (5-year-
olds) providing a complete cognitive cuing explana-
tion (e.g., “She’s sad because the dog makes her think
about her lost bunny”). Thus, young children demon-
strated a sophisticated appreciation of how active,
mental recollections of past negative experiences can make
a person feel sad or mad even when these thoughts
are at odds with current conditions.
Still, such burgeoning insights about connections
between current experience, the mind, and the past
were not evident in other kinds of affective situations,
situations for which adults explained emotions in
terms of prior experience, thinking, and cognitive cu-
ing nearly 100% of the time. For example, when a
character’s anger or sadness matched a current nega-
tive event (e.g., Mary feels sad when the dog tramples
her flowers), few preschoolers (0% 3-year-olds, 22%
4-year-olds, 50% 5-year-olds) suggested that the pro-
tagonist was thinking about the past. Rather, young
children often explained typical negative emotions as
caused by specific events in or character’s appraisals
of the current situation (e.g., “She’s sad because she
didn’t want her flowers ruined”). Preschoolers also
rarely explained people’s happiness, even happiness
that mismatched a current negative situation (e.g.,
happy despite a big bee on one’s arm; happy after
spilling a yummy milkshake) as caused by remem-
bering a positive past experience (M  23%). Not only
were preschoolers less aware that characters might be
thinking in these situations, but they also made
fewer connections to prior experience in general for
matched negative emotions (13% 3-year-olds, 33%
4-year-olds, 50% 5-year-olds) and for matched and
mismatched positive emotions (33% 3-year-olds, 31%
4-year-olds, 53% 5-year-olds). To be clear, it is not that
preschoolers’ explanations for these kinds of emo-
tional situations were not legitimate, sensible, or co-
herent; rather, these explanations were just not
framed in relation to past history or the mind as were
the adults’.
The reluctance of preschoolers to explain atypical
positive emotions in relation to thinking or past expe-
rience is perhaps most noteworthy. One explanation,
consistent with Stein and Levine (1987, 1989), is that
young children understand happiness to result not
only from the achieving or maintaining of goals, but
also from avoiding undesirable outcomes. Thus, chil-
dren may have focused on the salience of the immedi-
ate danger (having a bee on your arm) or negative
outcome (spilling a milkshake) in the current situa-
tion. Indeed, in their explanations for mismatched
positive emotions, some children did suggest that
happiness resulted from avoiding a potential nega-
tive outcome (e.g., “Frank’s happy because the bee
didn’t sting him”). Other explanations included as-
cribing idiosyncratic desires and beliefs to the protag-
onist (e.g., “He’s happy because maybe he doesn’t
like milkshakes”), or often, simply “I don’t know.”
Another interpretation is that despite young chil-
dren’s early awareness that negative thoughts can
sabotage positive situations, they do not endorse the
complementary view that positive thoughts can make
a person feel happy in a negative situation. Namely,
positive thoughts alone cannot override a clearly neg-
ative situation. This is certainly consistent with chil-
dren’s coping literature showing low endorsement
and awareness of “positive thinking” strategies in
children under age 7 (Altshuler & Ruble, 1989; Harris
& Lipian, 1989). In the words of one 4-year-old,
“When a bee is tickling you can’t think!”
What about the comparison between behaviors
and emotions? On the basis of the findings from
Flavell et al. (1995) and Lagattuta et al. (1997), it was
hypothesized that young children’s understanding of
past events, thinking, and cognitive cuing would be
advanced for emotional situations. This hypothesis
requires revision. Again, it is the special status of mis-
matched negative emotions that stands out, rather than
emotions per se. Three- and 4-year-olds were nearly
twice as likely to explain characters’ mismatched neg-
ative emotions in terms of cognitive cuing (20%
3-year-olds; 44% 4-year-olds) or thinking about the
past (50% 3-year-olds; 72% 4-year-olds) than charac-
ters’ behaviors (cognitive cuing  11% 3-year-olds,
25% 4-year-olds; thinking  28% 3-year-olds, 39%
4-year-olds); with 5-year-olds following the same, but
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less extreme, pattern. Excluding negative emotion-
mismatch stories, however, preschoolers’ explana-
tions for behavior-cuing situations were the same as,
or more sophisticated than, their explanations for
other emotion-cuing situations. In contrast, no emo-
tional situation took precedence for adults.
STUDY 2
The focus of this research thus far has been on chil-
dren’s explanations for the emotions of the target
character, a person for whom relevant past history in-
formation is known. As a control in Study 1, we asked
children to predict how another person, naïve to the
past event, would react to the scene where the cue ap-
peared. Even 3-year-olds consistently predicted that
this other person would experience different emo-
tions than the target character (74% accuracy). This
task provided a critical check that young children un-
derstand that the same situation can elicit different
emotions in different people.
An additional question concerns whether such
contrasting emotional reactions influence children’s
explanations for feelings. Indeed, divergent person-
to-person emotions represent another kind of “mis-
matched” emotional context, a mismatch between
two people’s emotional evaluation of the same event.
Perhaps the presence of two people experiencing dif-
ferent emotions in the same situation facilitates chil-
dren’s awareness of the link between mind and emo-
tion by highlighting the peculiarity of the target
character’s feelings. We know from related develop-
mental and social psychological research that chil-
dren’s and adults’ emotional reactions to events can be
influenced by how the people around them are acting
and feeling (Darley & Latane, 1968; Latane & Darley,
1968; Schachter & Singer, 1962) and that even as in-
fants we often look to, or socially reference, others’
emotional expressions to guide our interpretations of
novel experiences (Baldwin & Moses, 1996; Campos
& Sternberg, 1981; Feinman & Lewis, 1983; Mumme,
Fernald, & Herrera, 1996). Arguably, then, children’s
and adults’ explanations for emotions may likewise be
shaped by similarities or differences in how different
people react to the same situation.
Study 2, therefore, examined the relative influence
of both emotion–situation fit and person–person fit on
children’s and adults’ reasoning about the causes of
emotions, particularly mental causes. As with Study
1, emotion–situation fit indicates whether a person’s
emotion is conventional (emotion-match) or unusual
(emotion-mismatch) for the current circumstances.
In contrast, person–person fit denotes whether two
people in the same situation display identical
(person–person match) or divergent affective reac-
tions (person–person mismatch). To maintain equiv-
alence across story scenarios, all stories in Study 2
featured negative past events and current anger or
sadness in the target characters.
Figure 3 depicts how the story scenarios for Study
2 encompassed these varying degrees of emotion–
situation fit and person–person fit. Here again, Mary
feels sad after her rabbit is chased away by a black-
spotted dog. Many days later she feels sad again after
the dog wags his tail (emotion-mismatch), or knocks
down her flowers (emotion-match). For one ending,
Mary’s friend feels sad too (person–person match),
and for the other, she feels happy instead (person–
person mismatch). Participants were asked to explain
the cause of both characters’ feelings.
Note that in this story format the two characters
displaying emotions, the target character and the sec-
ondary character, have different personal connections
Figure 3 Illustrations for an emotion-cuing story used in
Study 2 shown in reduced form.
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to the cue in the current situation. Whereas the target
character has seen the cue before (e.g., Mary saw that
dog chase her rabbit), the other person is seeing the
cue for the first time. Study 2, therefore, also exam-
ined whether access to relevant past history informa-
tion affects how children and adults interpret the
causes of emotions. That is, for all story trials partici-
pants had to provide explanations for people’s feel-
ings when they had knowledge about their past (the
target characters) and when they did not (secondary
characters).
Study 2 additionally included some older children.
Three-year-olds were excluded and early grade-
school children added for two reasons: (1) the inclu-
sion of additional open-ended questions about the
secondary character increased the complexity of
the task; and (2) we reasoned that the use of person–
person emotion information may develop later be-
cause children become more cognizant about how
they compare with other people starting around the
ages of 6 to 8 (Butler, 1990; Ruble, Boggiano, Feldman,
& Loebl, 1980; Stipek, Recchia, & McClintic, 1992).
Method
Participants
Eighty children and adults participated: twenty
4-year-olds (M  4,7, range  4,1–5,0), twenty 5-
year-olds (M  5,6, range  5,1–6,0), twenty 6- and
7-year-olds (M  7,1; range  6,1–8,0), and twenty
young adults (M  19,2, range  18,2–21,3) with equal
numbers of males and females in each age group.
Children came from two local preschools and one
grammar school serving middle- to upper-middle-
class families, and college students were recruited
from a large midwestern university. Combined, the
participants were 77% European American, 14%
Asian American, and 9% other ethnicities. There was
no overlap in participants from Study 1 to Study 2.
Materials and Procedures
Emotion cuing stories (as in Figure 3) featured a
target character who experiences an event that makes
him or her sad or angry (lost pet, broken doll, stolen
teddy bear, bicycle hit by car). Many days later, he or
she encounters a visual cue related to the past nega-
tive event in either a pleasant or upsetting current sit-
uation and starts to feel sad or mad again. A second-
ary character, a friend, is also at the current event and
he or she either feels the same negative emotion or
feels happy instead. That is, each story had four pos-
sible endings that covered the four combinations of
emotion–situation fit and person–person fit. Specifi-
cally, the target character’s emotion (1) matched the
situation and matched the other person’s emotion
(MS-MP); (2) mismatched the situation but matched
the other person’s emotion (MMS-MP); (3) matched
the situation but mismatched the other person’s emo-
tion (MS-MMP); or (4) mismatched the situation and
mismatched the other person’s emotion (MMS-MMP).
During the testing procedure, 4-, 5-, and 7-year-olds
and adults listened to four stories as the experimenter
attached colorful picture cards onto an upright board.
Each participant received one story trial of each of the
four combinations of emotion–situation and person–
person fit. The order of the different story types was
randomized and counterbalanced across participants.
After the initial event, participants were told and
pictorially shown the target character’s facial expres-
sion (sad or mad) and were asked the control question,
“Why is [character] [sad or mad] right now?” At the
conclusion of the final event where the cue appears,
participants were informed through pictures and
words about the target character’s feelings as well as
the emotional reaction of the secondary character (the
different emotions were clearly juxtaposed; see Fig-
ure 3). The experimenter first asked participants to
explain the cause of the target character’s emotion
and then to provide an explanation for the secondary
character’s reaction. More specifically, the test ques-
tions were (1) “Why did [the target character] start to
feel [sad or mad] right now?”; and (2) “Why do you
think [the secondary character] feels [sad or mad]
too?” or “Why do you think [the secondary character]
feels happy instead?” The administration of the
supplementary test question as well as the thinking
prompt followed the same criteria as in Study 1.
Again, the experimenter helped participants clarify
their responses by paraphrasing their explanations
and encouraged them to provide multiple explana-
tions or guesses. Questioning for each story trial did
not end until the child repeatedly answered “I don’t
know” or provided no additional responses.
All participants were interviewed individually by
one of two white female experimenters (each experi-
menter interviewed half of the participants in each
age group) in a private room. All responses were
tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim. The proce-
dure lasted about 15 min.
Results
Coding
Explanations for the target characters’ and secondary
characters’ emotions were coded into the same four
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categories as in Study 1: (1) current experience, (2) prior
experience, (3) thinking, and (4) cognitive cuing. The
same criteria were used to distinguish prompted
from unprompted thinking and cognitive cuing ex-
planations. Recall that these categories are “embed-
ded” in the sense that thinking explanations were
also coded as prior experience explanations (i.e.,
thinking  prior experience  thinking), and cogni-
tive cuing explanations were also coded as both
thinking and prior experience explanations (i.e., cog-
nitive cuing  prior experience  thinking  cue).
To verify the accuracy of the coding, 50% of the
transcripts were coded by two independent raters.
This resulted in 98% interrater reliability across all
three categories for target and secondary character
explanations, including whether the explanations
were prompted or unprompted. All discrepancies were
resolved by discussion.
Analyses
Target character: Prior experience explanations. We be-
gin again with the fundamental distinction of whether
young children and adults made a connection be-
tween a character’s present emotions and his or her
distal past experience, a prior experience explanation
(e.g., “He’s mad because that car smashed his bicy-
cle”). Children and adults received a score from 0 to
4 for the number of story trials that they explained
a character’s current feelings in relation to his or her
past.
Table 4 presents the primary results. As shown in
the top row of the table, the consistency of prior expe-
rience explanations increased with age. An Age (4) 
Gender (2) ANOVA resulted in a main effect for age,
F(3, 72)  8.30, p  .001. Pairwise comparisons
(Tukey’s HSD) showed that 7-year-olds more fre-
quently explained present feelings as caused by a past
event than did 4-year-olds and that adults provided
more frequent references to prior experience than 4-
or 5-year-olds, ps  .05. There were no significant dif-
ferences between the 4- and 5-year-olds, or between
7-year-olds and adults. Gender was not significant
and will not be considered further.
The main body of Table 4 shows the effect of story
type on prior experience explanations. Again, adults
were excluded from the story type analyses because
of their near ceiling performance. An Age (3: 4-, 5-, or
7-year-olds)  Emotion–Situation Fit (2: the target
character’s emotion matches or mismatches the
present situation)  Person–Person Fit (2: the target
character’s emotion matches or mismatches the other
person’s) repeated measures ANOVA resulted in a
main effect for age, F(2, 57)  4.43, p  .02, and a main
effect for emotion–situation fit, F(1, 57)  22.88, p 
.001, both qualified by an Age  Emotion–Situation
Fit interaction that approached significance, F(2, 57) 
2.89, p  .06. As with Study 1, 4- and 5-year-olds used
prior experience more frequently to explain a per-
son’s negative emotion that mismatched versus
matched the current situation (for 4-year-olds, Ms 
73% versus 38%; for 5-year-olds, Ms  75% versus
58%), ps  .05 (simple effects). By age 7, however,
prior experience explanations were consistently of-
fered regardless of the fit between a person’s nega-
tive emotion and the situation. In contrast, person–
person fit had no effect at any age: 4-, 5- and 7-year-
olds (and adults) gave equivalent numbers of prior
experience explanations for the protagonist when
the secondary characters’ emotions were the same
(M  68% explanations) as when they were different
(M  70%).
Target character: Mental activity explanations. As with
Study 1, children and adults went beyond connecting
present emotions to a person’s past experience—they
often bridged present and past through specific refer-
ence to what the character was currently thinking
about or remembering, thinking explanations (e.g.,
“He’s mad because he remembers when she stole his
bear”). Indeed, many provided complete cognitive cu-
ing explanations by explaining that a character was
currently thinking about the past because he or she
saw an associative cue, or reminder (e.g., “He’s sad
because the car makes him think about his broken bi-
cycle”). Thus, we carried out two separate age (3: 4-,
5-, or 7-year-olds)  Emotion–Situation Fit (2) 
Person–Person Fit (2) repeated measures ANOVAs:
one for total thinking scores (0 to 4 for the number
of trials for which participants provided either
Table 4 Study 2: Percentage of Prior Experience Explanations
by Age and Story Type
Age
Category of Analysis 4 5 7 Adult
Across all storiesa 55 66 85 96
By story typeb
Emotion matches situation
Matches other person 35 50 80 90
Mismatches other person 40 65 80 95
Emotion mismatches situation
Matches other person 75 75 90 100
Mismatches other person 70 75 90 100
a Percentage of prior experience explanations out of four trials per
participant.
b Percentage across one trial of each Emotion–Situation Fit 
Person–Person Fit combination.
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prompted or unprompted thinking explanations);
and one for total cognitive cuing scores (0 to 4 for
the number of trials for which they provided
prompted or unprompted cognitive cuing explana-
tions). Adults were excluded from these story type
analyses because they provided thinking and cogni-
tive cuing explanations for nearly all trials (94%
explanations).
Table 5 shows the primary results. Both thinking
(top half) and cognitive cuing explanations (lower
half) increased with age, p  .001. Tukey’s HSD com-
parisons showed that 7-year-olds more frequently at-
tributed emotions to thinking about the past and to
cognitive cuing than 4-year-olds, ps  .01. Five-year-
olds were intermediate and did not differ from either
age group. As with prior experience explanations,
4- and 5-year-olds more frequently linked anger or
sadness to thinking about the past when these emo-
tions mismatched versus matched a current negative
situation (for 4-year-olds, Ms  55% versus 30%; for
5-year-olds, Ms  73% versus 53% explanations), ps 
.01. Moreover, 4- and 5-year-olds provided more
cognitive cuing explanations for unusual versus con-
ventional negative emotions (for 4-year-olds, Ms 
50% versus 23%; for 5-year-olds, Ms  68% versus
35% explanations), ps  .05. By age 7, children, like
adults, consistently used thinking and cognitive cuing
explanations for target characters’ emotions across all
situations. Again, person–person fit had no signifi-
cant influence at any age.
Past history information: Target versus secondary char-
acters. Recall that participants knew that the target
character had experienced a negative prior encounter
with the cue (e.g., the yellow car had broken Eric’s bi-
cycle), but they had no information about the second-
ary characters’ past. Thus, the comparison of partici-
pants’ explanations for the emotions of these two
characters provides the needed contrast to examine
the influence of past history information on children’s
understanding of persons’ emotional, mental lives.
As a baseline, first consider the number of story tri-
als (0 to 4) for which children and adults linked a
character’s emotions to their own or another person’s
prior experience (e.g., “She’s sad because her rabbit
ran away”; “She’s mad because maybe that clown
ruined her toy before too”). Table 6 shows the pri-
mary results. As shown at the top of the table, an Age
(4)  Character (2) repeated measures ANOVA re-
sulted in a main effect for character, F(1, 76)  293.24,
p  .001. At every age, prior experience was a com-
mon explanation for target characters’ emotions (M 
76% explanations). In contrast, it was rarely offered
by 4-, 5-, 7-year-olds, or by adults for secondary char-
acters’ emotions (M  24% explanations). Rather, ex-
planations for secondary characters most often fo-
cused exclusively on the current experience, such as,
“He’s mad because the girl knocked the tower
down.”
Next, consider a broader focus on mental expla-
nations. Does past history information influence the
Table 5 Study 2: Percentage of Target Character Thinking and Cognitive Cuing Explanations by
Age and Story Type
Story Typea








story typesbMPc MMPd MPc MMPd
Thinking explanations 4 30 30 50 60 43 (11)
5 45 60 75 70 63 (23)
7 75 75 85 90 81 (44)
Adults 85 90 100 100 94 (61)
Cognitive cuing explanations 4 25 20 45 55 36 (9)
5 30 40 75 60 51 (21)
7 75 75 75 85 78 (44)
Adults 85 90 100 100 94 (61)
a Percentage across one trial of each Emotion–Situation Fit  Person–Person Fit combination; all data
are total scores.
b Percentage across four trials; percentage of unprompted explanations is shown in parentheses next to
total score data.
c “MP” indicates that the target character’s emotion matches the secondary character’s emotion.
d “MMP” indicates that the target character’s emotion mismatches the secondary character’s emotion.
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frequency with which children and adults mention
internal-psychological causes as the explanation for
current emotions—not just thinking or remembering
but also references to a person’s desires, beliefs, atti-
tudes about, or empathy towards another person or
situation?
To examine this possibility, target character and
secondary character explanations were assessed for
whether they either (1) contained an explicit reference
to mind or emotion (e.g., know, believe, want, think,
like, hate), as in, “He’s mad because he didn’t want
her to play”; or (2) linked a person’s current emotion
to empathy for another character, such as, “She’s sad
because she feels sorry for her friend.” Participants
received a score from 0 to 4 for the target character and
0 to 4 for the secondary character totaling the number
of story trials for which they provided such internal-
psychological explanations. Interrater reliability based
on 50% of the transcripts at each age group was 97%.
Again, Table 6 shows the primary results. An Age
(4)  Character (2) repeated measures ANOVA re-
sulted in main effects for age and character, ps  .001.
Most importantly, both children and adults were more
likely to connect emotions to internal, psychological
causes when they were knowledgeable (M  80%
explanations) versus ignorant about a person’s past
(M  54%). Without information about the past, chil-
dren and adults more often explained emotions as
caused by external events, rather than the character’s
appraisal, desires, or beliefs about those events (e.g.,
“She’s happy because the clown gave everyone a
balloon”).
The concern in this analysis, however, was that
internal-psychological explanations may have been
lower for secondary characters, in part, because of
emotion valence. Whereas participants had to explain
the cause of only negative emotions for the target
character, they had to reason about both negative and
positive emotions for the secondary character. An
additional Age (4)  Character (2) repeated measures
ANOVA was therefore conducted for negative emo-
tions only. These data are shown in parentheses in
Table 6. Confirming the initial findings, there was a
large effect for character, p  .001. Indeed, children
and adults were nearly twice as likely to attribute
characters’ negative affect to internal-psychological
causes when they were knowledgeable (M  80% ex-
planations) versus ignorant (M  46%) about a per-
son’s past. This was true for negative emotions that
matched the current situation (Ms  69% versus 24%
for target versus secondary characters), and for nega-
tive emotions that mismatched the present circum-
stances (Ms  91% versus 69% for target versus sec-
ondary characters), ps  .05.
Discussion
As in Study 1, 4- and 5-year-olds demonstrated
greater knowledge about connections between present
emotions and the past and between thinking and feel-
ing in situations where target characters’ negative
emotions mismatched versus matched the current situ-
ation. Four-year-olds were twice as likely to suggest a
prior event (M  73% explanations), thinking (M 
55%), or cognitive cuing (M  50%) to explain a target
character’s anger or sadness in a currently positive
situation than his or her angry or sad feelings in a
currently negative situation. Similarly, 5-year-olds
also provided more prior experience, thinking, and
cognitive cuing explanations for mismatched versus
matched negative emotions (Ms  75% versus 60%,
73% versus 53%, and 70% versus 35% for prior ex-
Table 6 Study 2: The Influence of Past History Information on Explanations for Emotions
Past History Information
Category Age Knowna Unknownb Combinedc
Prior experience explanations 4 55 19 37
5 66 19 43
7 85 25 55
Adult 96 33 65
Internal-psychological explanations 4 61 39 (35)d 50 (48)d
5 74 44 (45)d 59 (59)d
7 88 58 (43)d 73 (65)d
Adult 96 74 (63)d 85 (79)d
a Explanations for target characters’ emotions in Study 2.
b Explanations for secondary characters’ emotions in Study 2.
c Percentage combined across character type; out of eight trials per participant.
d Percentage of internal-psychological explanations for just negative emotions is shown in parentheses.
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perience, thinking, and cognitive cuing explanations
respectively).
Additionally, Study 2 included 6- and 7-year-olds
not tested in Study 1. These older children demon-
strated a pervasive, extended understanding of mind
and emotion—one that did not differ significantly
from that of adults. Early grade-school children consis-
tently offered prior experience, thinking, and cognitive
cuing explanations for all target characters’ negative
emotions, regardless of whether these feelings matched
(Ms  75% or better) or mismatched (Ms  80% or
better) present objective circumstances. In compari-
son with younger children, the frequency of such ex-
planations for matched emotions is most striking.
That is, even when a person’s anger or sadness could
be attributed to the present situation alone, 6- and 7-
year-olds, like adults, coordinated present and past
into multitemporal situational and mental explana-
tions, such as, “Mark’s mad because the girl knocked
down his tower AND because she makes him think
about when his teddy bear was stolen.”
The comparison of emotion explanations for target
characters (whose past was known) versus secondary
characters (whose past was unknown) was especially
revealing. These analyses showed that a biographical
framework encourages children, like adults, to ex-
plain people’s emotions in terms of their personal life
histories, as well as their desires, beliefs, or thoughts
about current or past situations. Indeed, 4-, 5-, and
7-year-olds and adults were three times as likely to
suggest prior experience for target characters’ nega-
tive emotions (M  76% explanations) than for second-
ary characters’ mad or sad emotions (M  24%) and
nearly twice as likely to provide internal-psychological
explanations for target characters’ negative emotions
(M  80% explanations) than for secondary charac-
ters’ negative emotions (M  47%). When a person’s
relevant past history was unknown, emotions were
more often explained in relation to recent events (e.g.,
“He’s sad because he fell down”; “He’s happy be-
cause the car did a trick”). Consistent with these find-
ings, prior studies have shown that adults attribute
people’s behavior to more complex psychological
and historical influences when they know versus
don’t know about their past history (see Bem, 1972;
Jones, 1990; Jones & Nisbett, 1971; Kelley, 1967, 1971).
The current research not only extends this reasoning
to emotions but further demonstrates such social sen-
sitivity in 4-year-olds.
Finally, the noneffect of person–person fit in Study
2 is of importance. Children and adults attributed the
target characters’ negative emotions to prior experi-
ence, thinking, and cognitive cuing as frequently
when the secondary character felt the same negative
emotion as when the secondary character felt happy
instead. That is, the juxtaposition of feelings between
the two characters did not help spotlight the peculiar-
ity of the target characters’ emotional response. It is
not, however, that children and adults neglected to
consider the other person in their emotion explana-
tions. For example, 15% of 4-year-olds, 25% of 5-year-
olds, 30% of 7-year-olds, and 40% of adults explained
that a person’s emotions resulted from empathy (e.g.,
“She’s sad because she feels sorry for her friend”),
with the majority of participants (69%) suggesting
at least once that a character’s emotions were caused
by knowledge, ignorance, or lack of shared experi-
ence in the friend’s past trauma (e.g., “He’s happy be-
cause he doesn’t know about the broken bicycle”).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In contrast to voluminous descriptions of young chil-
dren’s knowledge about mental states, such as beliefs,
desires, and intentions (see Lewis & Mitchell, 1994;
Perner, 1991; Wellman, 1990), much less is known
about their understanding of active thinking (see Fla-
vell et al., 1995). Even more neglected, but perhaps
more important, are investigations of the coherence of
children’s mental state understandings. In particular,
how do young children sum together a person’s expe-
riences and mental states to create a sense of that per-
son’s life history—an individual, extended through
time; a person whose current thoughts, feelings, and
actions are continually influenced by his or her past?
Our findings suggest a provocative developmental
account of these understandings by revealing the
situations where young children first demonstrate
knowledge about past–present connections and think-
ing and the situations where they do not. Most cen-
trally, our data suggest that preschoolers’ explana-
tions for negative emotions, particularly those that
mismatch, or are discordant with, current situations,
provide an early breeding ground for developing a co-
herent mental and historical understanding of people.
Early Achievements
Recognizing continuity between past experience
and current life is a critical feature of mature psycho-
logical reasoning. This awareness enables the devel-
opment of an autobiographical sense of self, or the
ability to appreciate the self as essentially “the same
person” despite physical changes or the passage of
time (see Povinelli & Simon, 1998). More importantly,
linkages between past and present provide an alter-
native explanatory framework for making sense
of our own actions and emotions as well as those of
98 Child Development
the people around us. That is, throughout our every-
day lives, we often predict or explain people’s reac-
tions not only in relation to present objective circum-
stances but also in relation to their past actions and
experiences (Jones, 1990; Kelley, 1967, 1971; Ross &
Nisbett, 1991).
The current data show that most 3-year-olds recog-
nize connections between people’s current situations
and their past history, at least at times. Across both
studies, historical reasoning was particularly com-
mon when children were asked to explain why a
character, who had experienced a negative event in
the past (Anne’s doll is broken by a clown), later
started to feel upset in a currently positive situation
(the clown gives Anne a balloon). In their explana-
tions for unusual anger or sadness, most 3-, 4-, and
5-year-olds suggested that characters’ feelings were
caused by the distal past (e.g., “Anne’s sad because
that’s the clown that broke her doll before”). More-
over, 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds consistently predicted
that a person who did not share in the past event
would have a different affective reaction to the cur-
rent situation (e.g., Anne’s friend will feel happy to
get the balloon). These explanations and predictions
show that not only can young children link a person’s
present and past experiences, but they further under-
stand that prior experience can have a lasting effect.
Indeed, only 4% of preschoolers never referred to a
person’s past in their explanations for emotions or
actions.
Still, preschoolers went beyond just making sense
of characters’ present feelings in terms of their dis-
tinctive past events. They used mental activity to
bridge together characters’ past and present experi-
ences. Again, these early insights were especially cen-
tered around mismatched negative emotions. Half of
the 3-year-olds and most 4- and 5-year-olds explained
that a character’s atypical anger or sadness was not
just connected to prior experience but rather was
caused by remembering that past negative incident
(e.g., “Anne’s sad because she’s remembering her
broken doll”). Moreover, many preschoolers (a mi-
nority of 3-year-olds and most 5-year-olds) provided
complete cognitive cuing explanations, which showed
that they not only understood when and what a per-
son was thinking about but also why (e.g., “Mary’s
sad because the dog makes her think about her
bunny”). Thus, during the preschool years children
increasingly appreciate that past experiences are in-
fluential when we remember them—through actively
thinking and focusing on them. Indeed, young chil-
dren recognize that mental recollections are some-
times so powerful that they can induce emotions in-
commensurate with current reality, such as feeling
mad in a conventionally happy situation because of
angry thoughts.
Later Developments
At the same time that young children revealed
strong awareness of historical and mental causes of
mismatched negative emotions, they often ignored
people’s prior history in their explanations for other
reactions and chose instead to focus on antecedents in
the present scene. For example, only a minority of
preschoolers attributed people’s current happiness,
even happy feelings during negative events (e.g.,
happy after spilling a milkshake) to thinking about
the past. Moreover, when negative feelings matched
current events (e.g., Anne’s mad when the clown
soaks her with a water balloon), 3-year-olds never
and 4- and 5-year-olds inconsistently suggested that
characters might be remembering a prior negative in-
cident. Finally, preschoolers, especially 3- and 4-year-
olds, infrequently explained characters’ current be-
haviors in terms of thinking about the past. Indeed,
outside the context of mismatched negative emo-
tions, 3- to 5-year-olds typically centered on salient
events in the here and now, providing sensible and le-
gitimate present-focused explanations such as, “He’s
happy because he’ll get another milkshake,” or
“Anne’s mad because she’s wet.”
When combined with data from 6- and 7-year-olds,
a more complete developmental picture emerges.
First, explanations by these older children and by
adults revealed that mismatched negative emotions
are significant for early development. In contrast to
preschoolers, 6- and 7-year-olds and adults explained
nearly all negative emotions in terms of being re-
minded about a past negative event, when such bio-
graphical information was available for consider-
ation. Even when anger or sadness matched present
objective events, children as young as 6 years largely
provided mental explanations: “Brian’s sad because
he fell down and because the car reminds him about
his broken bicycle.” Second, the inclusion of older
participants showed that biographical information is
influential across age. That is, without knowledge
about prior experience (secondary characters), children
and adults rarely provided past-related causes, nor did
they consistently suggest internal-psychological in-
fluences of emotions, such as a person’s beliefs or de-
sires. Therefore, mismatched negative emotions in
conjunction with past history information provide an
important entryway for recognizing the influence of
life history and ongoing thoughts. These early in-
sights then quickly expand into more pervasive, com-
prehensive understandings.
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Conclusions
Aside from illuminating the strengths and weak-
nesses of children’s knowledge about past events and
thoughts, preschoolers’ differential performance on dif-
ferent story types provides a critical methodological
control. For example, it is possible that the extended
procedures used in this research to elicit explanations
simply provoked indiscriminate, talkative answers. Or
it could be argued that the tasks unnaturally prompted
children to consider past events. That is, young chil-
dren may have attributed emotions to thinking about
the past because relevant biographical information was
blatantly presented. Moreover, it is possible that par-
ticipants themselves were “cued” to remember the past
events and then merely reported their own thoughts.
Several findings refute such concerns. For exam-
ple, children made different predictions for (Study 1)
and provided different explanations for (Study 2) the
emotions of secondary characters versus target char-
acters, even though both people were in the same cur-
rent situation. Even more, the very fact that pre-
schoolers often failed to consider prior experience in
their explanations for target characters’ positive emo-
tions, matched negative emotions, and behaviors is
methodologically important. That is, despite parallel
information provided across story types (specific past
experiences and present cues), only in the particular
case of mismatched negative emotions did preschool-
ers consistently look to the past to explain current
emotions. Take, for example, mismatched positive emo-
tions. Many preschoolers were baffled by unusual
positive emotions to the point that one 4-year-old
suggested that such emotions cannot be explained—
even if one were a “professional, adult, mystery spy”!
Therefore, the sophistication of preschoolers’ explana-
tions for mismatched negative emotions cannot be re-
duced to a methodological artifact. Rather, young chil-
dren explain unusual negative emotions in terms of past
events and thoughts because these emotions, events,
and thoughts are meaningfully connected in their minds.
Differences in young children’s explanations for
emotions across different situations further reconcile
conflicting evidence about how to characterize young
children’s understanding about interconnections be-
tween past events, thinking, and emotions. The cur-
rent findings do not demonstrate that preschoolers
have general early competence in reasoning about life
history, mind, and emotion. Consistent with prior re-
search, the present results affirm that young children’s
understanding about thinking (see Flavell et al., 1993,
1995), the influence of prior experience (see Gnepp
1983; Gnepp, Klayman, & Trabasso, 1982; Harris,
1989), and the connection between thinking and emo-
tion (see Altshuler & Ruble, 1989; Harris, 1989; Harris
& Lipian, 1989) is limited in comparison with older
children and adults. Uniquely, however, the data
from this current research also reveal that young chil-
dren’s minimal understanding about historical–mental
connections in some situations coexists with sophisti-
cated knowledge in other situations. That is, when
story scenarios combined negative affect, incongruity
between emotion and situation, and past history in-
formation, 3- to 5-year-olds demonstrated early, co-
herent knowledge about people in historical and
mental terms. Presumably, this triad of features is so
compelling because it matches young children’s early
concerns, experiences, and nascent understandings.
This speculation leads to an important remaining
question: Why are mismatched negative emotions
and past history information important in the devel-
opment of children’s initial insights about people in
terms of their distinctive pasts and their thoughts?
That is, how can we account for the striking disparity
in children’s ability to recognize thinking and past–
present linkages in different contexts? Research on
adult social understanding and young children’s con-
versations yield informative clues.
In our day-to-day interactions, humans perceive
people’s behaviors and emotions as caused by
something—whether by situations, personality traits,
motivation, thoughts, desires, and so on (Heider,
1944, 1958). Because we believe that actions or emo-
tions have a source, we try to figure out why they
happened (Bem, 1972; Kelley, 1967, 1971). Several
studies have shown that adults are more compelled to
discover the reasons for negative or unexpected out-
comes than to explain positive or expected events (see
Weiner, 1985). This search for explanation is not pecu-
liar to adults. Starting around age 2, children begin to
use causal expressions in their speech to explain the
actions or emotions of themselves and other people
(Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Bloom & Capatides, 1987;
Dunn, Bretherton, & Munn, 1987; Dunn & Brown,
1991; Hood & Bloom, 1979; Wellman, Hickling, &
Schult, 1997). During the preschool years, explana-
tions for people’s emotions, especially their negative
feelings, become a dominant focus of these conversa-
tions (Brown, 1995; Dunn & Brown, 1993; Hudson,
1991; Lagattuta, 1999; Miller & Sperry, 1988). Chil-
dren’s early interest in negative emotions is evident
not only in their speech but also in their empathetic
actions toward people in distress (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-
Yarrow, Wagner, & Chapman, 1992).
This focus on negative emotions arguably encour-
ages children to develop earlier, more sophisticated
discoveries about their causes in comparison with
other affective states (e.g., happiness) or behaviors.
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This seems particularly true when a person’s negative
emotions are unusual for a situation. Because simple
situation-based explanations do not suffice, children
are forced to consider alternative, person-specific men-
tal and historical influences. In their attempts to ex-
plain these salient and naturally occurring events,
children acquire increasingly complex and coherent
understandings about minds and emotions and how
they influence a person’s life in individual, histori-
cally connected ways. Indeed, preschoolers’ common
practice of reminiscing with family members about
past events and emotions, particularly negative ones
(Dunn et al., 1987; Dunn & Brown, 1991, 1993; Fivush,
1991; Hudson, 1990; Kuebli & Fivush, 1992; Miller &
Sperry, 1988; Reese, Haden, & Fivush, 1993), may pro-
vide them with the very model for recognizing these
important connections. That is, when remembering
and talking about past negative events, children may
reexperience the same negative affect or notice such
emotion changes in others: feelings not caused by the
present situation but by thinking about the past.
If this account is correct then it inspires further re-
search. For example, we have shown that young chil-
dren differentially use past history information to ex-
plain different kinds of emotions and behaviors. An
important question thus becomes whether and when
children seek this kind of information in their every-
day interactions. As Baldwin and Moses (1996) aptly
argue, there is a big difference between being a “con-
sumer” versus a “seeker” of social knowledge. Thus,
how often do children keep track of the personal
experiences of family members and friends? How
frequently do they use such historical explanations
for emotions? Relatedly, the current findings reveal
that young children are more knowledgeable about
historical-mental causes of negative emotions in com-
parison with positive emotions. Thus, how does emo-
tion valence affect young children’s “seeking” of
knowledge or explanation? For example, do young
children differentially seek and provide information
about the sources of their own and other people’s neg-
ative emotions in contrast to positive emotions? Sys-
tematic investigations of the specific kinds of causal expla-
nations young children use and the questions they ask
about past and present emotions would reveal more
clearly how they develop and implement a coherent
understanding of life history, mind, and emotion in
their day-to-day understanding of self and others.
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